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RECONSIDERING REPRISALS
MICHAEL A. NEWTON*
ABSTRACT
The prohibition on the use of reprisals is widely regarded as one of
the most sacrosanct statements of the jus in bello applicable to the conduct
of modern hostilities. The textual formulations are stark and subject to no
derogations. Supporters of the bright line ban describe it as a vital
“bulwark against barbarity.” In the words of the International Committee
of the Red Cross, the prohibition is “absolute,” despite the fact that the
declarations of key states indicate residual ambiguity over the scope of
permissible reprisals, particularly in the context of non-international
armed conflicts. Reprisals are a recurring feature of state practice, though
conducted under varying legal rubrics and shifting rationales. Reasonable
reprisals grounded on an empirical assessment of their deterrent value or
framed as appropriate punishment for prior acts of terror may be the most
morally acceptable and humane strategy for serving a strategic imperative
of civilized society. Limited reprisals may in practice be essential to
counteract the growing threat of transnational terrorists. Reasonable
reprisals may represent the best long term way to erode support for those
who would mobilize terrorist actors to willfully ignore the rules protecting
innocent civilians thereby violating the most basic human rights of their
victims. This is especially true if nations create clear lines of agreed legal
authorities supported by independent adjudication of the motives and
methods employed in such reprisals. Peace-loving states should seek
common ground to enhance efforts to protect innocent citizens from the
effects of terrorist violence. Thoughtful and multilateral reassessment of
the lawful scope and rationale for reasonable reprisals is overdue.

* Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. For contact information
see http://law.vanderbilt.edu/newton. The errors, omissions, and oversights of this essay are solely my
own. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance and insight gleaned from the participants in the War
Bound by Law Symposium at Duke University School of Law. Special appreciation is due to Laurence
Helfer, Larry May, Michael Scharf, Mark Osiel, Ingrid Wuerth, Isaac Sanders, Ken Anderson, and
Shane Darcy for their intellectual insights on this important topic.
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INTRODUCTION
The prohibition against armed reprisals remains one of the most well
established jus in bello benchmarks, at least in principle and in textual
proscription. Acts of reprisal are strongly disfavored on the face of the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.1 They are
nevertheless, and have been, widespread in actual state practice,2 albeit
often carried out under alternative legal rubrics and shifting rationales.
Rather than relying on a clear right of reprisals grounded in the law
regulating the conduct of hostilities, states have most frequently resorted to
the rhetoric of sovereign prerogative in defense of national security
interests or other vital sovereign assets as the rationale for de facto
reprisals. This shift into the de fault realm of jus ad bellum leaves many
unanswered questions and assures that every decision to use force against
terrorist actors is not only highly scrutinized, but also highly suspect when
viewed through the jus in bello lens.3 From the perspective of the
aspirational goals of humanitarian law, it might be considered heresy for
any international lawyer to contemplate reconsideration of the normative
rationale and scope for reasonable armed reprisals. That is precisely the
purpose of this brief essay.
As former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld wrote, “[t]here
is a point at which everything becomes simple and there is no longer any
question of choice, because all you have staked will be lost if you look

1. See infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
specifically reinforces the provisions of the Geneva Conventions related to reprisals in the material
breach provisions of Article 60. States may not invoke material breach as a ground for terminating a
treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part when another state has breached obligations
related to “the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in
particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(5), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
(1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
2. See, e.g., William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-defense in Counterterror
Operations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 462, 464-65 (1990); Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945—Resurrection
of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL’Y 1, 16-17 (2003) (discussing the U.S. bombings in Tripoli, Libya in response to what was
characterized as a “pattern of indiscriminate violence” against U.S. citizens by Libya); U.S. Explains Its
Missile Attack on Iraq to Security Council, Agence Fr.-Press, June 27, 1993, available at 1993 WL
10739350 (discussing the U.S. argument that the bombing of Iraqi targets in response to the
assassination attempt on former president George H. W. Bush was an act of legitimate self defense);
Amos N. Guiora, Self-Defense - From the Wild West to 9/11: Who, What, When, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
631, 661-62 (2008) (discussing the targeting of al Qaeda linked targets in Sudan and Afghanistan by 79
cruise missiles in response to the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).
3. See, e.g., William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE L.J. 295
(2004).
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back. Life’s point of no return.”4 September 11 removed any ability for
responsible governments to hide behind a façade of complacent
commercial pursuits because acts of transnational terrorism threaten the
economic, social, and institutional foundations of states around the world.
Phrased another way, the very foundations of modern society, grounded on
respect for humanity dignity and the individual worth of each citizen,
would be fundamentally altered if leaders succumb to the manipulation and
the will of those who plan and orchestrate transnational terrorist acts. If
indeed acts of terror can be categorized as deliberate attacks against the
fabric of civilized society and the interests of peace-loving peoples, then
the most fundamental obligation of governments is to ensure the survival of
societal order by using every feasible method to deter their repetition and
eradicate the threat of recurring terrorism.
The paradox is that the most humane way to preserve human lives and
liberties in the larger sense may be to use limited armed reprisals that many
would argue are, by definition, inhumane and seemingly random from the
narrow perspective of the (often innocent) recipients. Thus, nearly a decade
after the shock of the September 11 attacks, the civilized nations of the
world struggle to articulate a common framework for repressing acts of
transnational terror and for responding in a swift and unified manner when
appropriate. In effect, the very certainty of the legal prohibition on reprisals
creates an unsettling indeterminacy precisely because it reveals a chasm
between the common sense of ordinary people who know that terrorists
must be stopped if societal order is to endure and the conflicting
obligations of governments to abide by settled international law while
defending the lives and property within their jurisdiction.
One principle of international law and unity is absolutely clear.
Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most
serious threats to international peace and security, as well as perhaps the
most pernicious threat to the fundamental human rights of private peaceloving citizens even nearly a decade after September 11. There is universal
and strongly articulated support for the positivist legal premise that “any
acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their
motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and are to be
unequivocally condemned.”5 The U.N. General Assembly reaffirms that

4. DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD, MARKINGS 66 (transl. Leif Sjöberg & W.H. Auden 1981).
5. S. C. Res. 14565, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (2003). The United Nations
Global Counterterrorism Strategy reiterates the “strong condemnation” of the international community
and states the same principle as follows: “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by
whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes.”
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“no terrorist act can be justified in any circumstances.”6 The security,
stability, economic vitality, sovereignty, political independence, and citizen
safety of all states should be protected against terrorist acts, irrespective of
how democratic or human rights compliant the government in question. It
is inconceivable that organized societies or the governments that are sworn
to protect and defend their interests would merely shrug in resignation to
the reality of ongoing transnational terrorism.
These cornerstones of legal and policy cohesion spawned an
extremely rare fever of international unity in the aftermath of the al Qaeda
attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. President Bush declared a state
of national emergency,7 and the U.N. Security Council swiftly passed
Resolution 1368 on a unanimous vote categorizing the attacks as a “threat
to international peace and security,” affirming the “inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense” expressed in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, and specifically directing “all States to work together urgently to
bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist
attacks.”8 For the first time in its storied existence, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (“NATO”) invoked the principle of Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, thereby recognizing that the attacks constituted an
“armed attack” consistent with the treaty’s provisions that trigger NATO
obligations to assist another member so attacked.9 NATO aircraft helped to
fly combat air patrols over U.S. airspace in the immediate wake of the
attacks.10
On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed a joint session of
Congress, aware that the world—and perhaps key figures in the terrorist
network—were listening. He declared that “we are a country awakened to
danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and
anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring
justice to our enemies, justice will be done.”11 The declaration of this clear
6. UNGAOR (62d Sess.), Agenda Item 108, Measures to eliminate international terrorism, 13
Nov. 2007, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/62/L.14.
7. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).
8. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). The Security Council stressed that
“those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring [sic] the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of
these attacks will be held accountable.” Id.
9. Press Release, NATO, Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed (Oct. 2, 2001) http://
www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
10. NATO and the fight against terrorism, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48801.htm
(last visited May 21, 2010) (describing Operation Eagle Assist which lasted from October 2001 to May
2002 and was intended to free up U.S. air assets for strikes against Afghanistan, from which the
September 11 attacks were planned and launched).
11. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://
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national goal was met by the thunderous applause of the assembled
Congress and audience (which also included British Prime Minister Tony
Blair). His words stirred citizens across America to strengthen a communal
resolve and rededicate a mutual commitment to the goal of justice.
President Bush further declared that the campaign against international
terrorism12 is more than just a fight to secure American freedoms because it
is “civilization’s fight” in the sense that it will be waged on behalf of all the
people who “believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.”13
Congress responded by enacting the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use
of United States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent
Attacks Launched Against the United States (“AUMF”). The much
discussed, and arguably much abused, AUMF authorized the president “to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 . . . .”14 However,
those who pose serious threats to the people and property of the United
States will not always be associated with al Qaeda, nor within the domestic
authority granted by the AUMF. Civilized nations that seek to deter
terrorist acts in the future are forced to either make contorted arguments
that will likely be rejected by a politicized United Nations as in the past, or
simply disregard the textual prohibitions of the Geneva Conventions and
www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/092001.pdf [hereinafter Joint Session]. Secretary of State
Powell echoed a similar sentiment in his first public comments made in Lima, Peru:
A terrible, terrible tragedy has befallen my nation, . . . but . . . you can be sure that America
will deal with this tragedy in a way that brings those responsible to justice. You can be sure
that as terrible a day as this is for us, we will get through it because we are a strong nation, a
nation that believes in itself.
BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 10 (2002).
12. For a definition of international terrorism, see 18 U.S.C. § 2331, providing that for the
purposes of the federal criminal law, the term
“international terrorism” means activities that
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended –
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territory jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek
asylum.
13. Joint Session, supra note 11.
14. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
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the Additional Protocols. Thus, the current complete ban on reprisals
against non-state actors or the state officials that support and sponsor them
may prevent future U.S. administrations from addressing emerging threats
before many more lives are lost and transnational terrorists disrupt
international order.
In tension with the paralysis spawned by the textual prohibitions of the
jus in bello, the emotionalism of ordinary people following the immediate
aftermath of the September 11 attacks generated a reality that is generally
unnoticed, or at least tactfully overlooked by international law elites and
academics. The esoteric discussion of “justice” in the context of terrorist
acts does not provoke images of ardent advocacy before marbled benches
or admiration for arguments regarding evidentiary exceptions. At a visceral
level, both the immediate victims and the larger societal interests yearn for
some sort of retribution. We know “justice” when we see it, and our human
nature leads many to hope that terrorists will feel some measure of the pain
that they inflicted on innocents. If commentators candidly acknowledged
the conversations in families around the world affected by terrorist
violence, they would concede that at some base level transnational
terrorists who target and kill innocent victims on an indiscriminate basis
deserve to be punished for that cruelty. Attacks on innocent victims stir an
inevitable undercurrent of yearning for retribution, or even revenge, in its
starkest form.
On the one hand, thoughtful modernists are aware that a quest for
revenge on a personal or societal level is unseemly and likely
counterproductive to lasting peace. Our moral compass would be troubled
if we could contemplate a degree of pleasure from deliberate infliction of
human suffering, even if we deemed it to be well earned and deserving
based on a larger utilitarian calculus. Many citizens would be vaguely
ashamed that part of our consciousness would exult in acts of retaliation.
Even then, the undercurrent of emotion that “they got what they deserved”
would bring a comforting assurance that the baseline of our civilized
structures cannot be reshaped at the whim of terrorist actors. At the same
time, organized civil society subconsciously rejects perspectives that
postulate a moral or legal equivalence between an enemy that deliberately
and repeatedly violates the basic norms of international law and a
professional military that is required to “comply with the law of war during
all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all
other military operations.”15 On the 60th anniversary of the Geneva

15. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, ¶ 4.1 (9
May 2006), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101p.pdf. This Directive
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Conventions, the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, for
example, articulated the rationale for jus in bello norms that preserve
appropriate discipline and the humanity of state actors because “those who
take hostages, or send trucks bombs into apartment buildings, or rockets
into civilian neighborhoods have no legitimacy.”16
Resuscitation of the law of reprisals has the potential to provide
precisely the kind of pressure release valve to channel the cognitive cross
currents noted above. To be clear, in my view reasonable and rational
armed reprisals should not be confused with a wholly justifiable
condemnation of collective punishments. It is not at all the purpose of this
short essay to propose a sweeping regime of indiscriminate retaliation not
rooted in the clear responsibility of individual wrongdoers. Given the
extensive framework of developed humanitarian law, this essay postulates
that the bright-line rule banning all reprisals under all circumstances creates
imprecision that may actually facilitate further terrorist crimes by hindering
effective state responses. The imperative to act on the basis of popular will
may explain the prevalence of state action to retaliate against threats to
persons and property, even when policy makers took great pains to
carefully describe their actions by reference to more acceptable legal and
moral frameworks. In a larger sense, a reconsideration of the law of
reprisals could close the gap between the phraseology of international law
and its practice in the gritty world of pragmatism in pursuit of imperative
state interests. Reprisals are prohibited in theory, as will be explained in
more detail below. Nevertheless, the generalized cloud of good will
generated by the bright-line prohibition may foster further illegal acts on
the part of non-state actors who feel as though they are unconstrained by
the norms of international law, yet are simultaneously protected from state
retaliation by the very treaties they disregard and exploit.
Furthermore, this essay in no way contemplates resuscitation of a
genus of reprisals that would permit state actors to lash out against persons
based on high emotion or the pressure of popular opinion whether or not

replaced the 1998 Directive that required that United States Armed Forces to “comply with the law of
war in the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts
are characterized.” This is a policy statement worthy of commendation that also makes pragmatic sense
from the standpoint of the commander responsible for controlling the conduct of hostilities in a lawful
manner; it must also be understood in the context of the clear jurisprudential rejection of any defense to
war crimes based on an argument of tu quoque or lack of reciprocity by an opponent in an armed
conflict. Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, ¶ 250 (Appeals Judgment, 12 Nov.
2009) (upholding the Trial Chamber sentence of 29 years confinement).
16. Ambassador Susan E. Rice, Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent
Representative to United Nations, on 60th Anniversary of Geneva Conventions, Dec. 3, 2009 (on file
with author).
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there is a clearly defined operational purpose and concomitant
consideration of the applicable principles of humanitarian law. Mere acts of
emotive revenge never create the conditions of lasting peace. Acts of
emotional revenge directed against innocent civilians are crimes under all
circumstances, and ought to be seen as illegal and indeed imprudent as an
operational matter precisely because they undermine the popular support
that will be the decisive element in eliminating the phenomenon of
terrorism in the next decade. Quite the contrary, when states do act, as they
often have in the past thirty years since the complete ban on reprisals took
root in the soil of the Additional Protocols, they are forced to defend their
actions on alternative legal grounds. State action that constitutes what I
believe would accurately be described as reprisals, such as, inter alia, the
bombing of Tripoli, or the cruise missile strikes in Sudan17 and Afghanistan
following the failed attempt to murder former president George H. W.
Bush, is recognizable as such to the population of non-legal laypeople yet
is normally justified using the rhetoric of lawful self defense conducted
pursuant to the inherent right of sovereign states. Because there are no
internationally defined standards for lawful reprisals, the corresponding
commingling of jus ad bellum with jus in bello constraints has created legal
uncertainty that clouds the legality of state responses to terrorist acts and
hinders rapid responsiveness to protect people’s basic rights.
At worst, the current legal uncertainty emboldens terrorists because,
while humanitarian law belongs to the armed forces of the world and
imposes an inalterable professional obligation, the legal lacunae permit
terrorist information operations to make it into a media tool to be
manipulated and sensationalized. The incoherence in explaining sovereign
responses to terrorist acts permits the legal structure to be portrayed as
nothing more than a mass of indeterminate subjectivity that is nothing more
than another weapon in the moral domain of conflict at the behest of the
side with the best cameras, biggest microphones, and most compliant
media accomplices. There is a very real danger that terrorist video tapes
and leaked statements can create manipulation of an all too willing
international media and therefore mask genuine violations of the law with
spurious allegations and misrepresentations of the actual state of the law.
Failure to articulate the correct state of the law in turn feeds into an
undercurrent of suspicion and politicization that erodes the very
foundations of humanitarian law. At the very least, the current legal
17. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 559 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (affirming the dismissal of claims related to the 1998 bombing in Sudan on the basis that the
President’s publicly stated self defense rationale and the purported linkage of the pharmaceutical plants
owners to terrorist organizations are non-justiciable political questions).
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framework allows terrorist organizations and their sympathizers to portray
state responses as legally questionable. In the future, reasonable reprisals
grounded on an empirical assessment of their deterrent value or framed as
appropriate punishment or retribution for prior acts of terror may be the
best way of eroding support for those who would mobilize terrorist actors
to willfully ignore the rules protecting innocent civilians and violate the
most basic human rights of their innocent victims. Limited reprisals may
well be the most moral and humanitarian response to the growing threat of
transnational terrorism.
The current state of affairs requires international law to bear too much
weight, and has the predictable consequence of causing critics to discount
the larger endeavor to regulate conflicts. Commenting on the impractical
aspects of Additional Protocol I, the eminent Dutch jurist Bert Röling (who
served on the bench of the Tokyo International Military Tribunal) observed
that treaty provisions ought not “prohibit what will foreseeably occur”
because the “laws of war are not intended to alter power relations, and if
they do they will not be observed.”18 The disconnects between aspirational
legal rules and human experience are borne out in operational experience
by states that act decisively to protect the lives and property of their
citizens, which feeds an undercurrent of suspicion and politicization that
could erode the very foundations of humanitarian law. This gap in turn
leads to a cycle of cynicism and second-guessing that could weaken the
commitment of some policy makers or military forces to actually follow the
law.
More to the point, the absence of express authority to plan and
conduct careful reprisals against those who plan and practice acts of
transnational terror creates precisely the climate that may well generate
additional acts of terrorism. Thus, a thoughtful reconsideration of reprisals
is in order for those who seek to craft an international legal regime that is
both effective at inducing compliance yet responsive to evolving
international experience.19 This essay will conclude by framing the
rationale for reconsideration of the flat prohibition on reprisals. Before
considering the merits of what would be a highly controversial
reconsideration, the next section will recount the historical basis for the
prohibition and its current articulation in the authoritative texts governing
jus in bello.
18. Bert Röling, Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War, REVUE BELGE DE
12, 25-26 (1976), quoted in GEOFFREY BEST, WAR & LAW SINCE 1945 391 (1997).
19. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1823 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997).
DROIT INT’l,
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I. THE LEX LATA OF REPRISALS
International law restricts the class of persons against whom violence
may be applied during armed conflicts, even as it bestows affirmative
rights to wage war in accordance with accepted legal restraints. Because of
the central importance of these categorizations, the standards for
ascertaining the legal line between lawful and unlawful participants in
conflict provided the intellectual impetus for the evolution of the entire
field of law relevant to the conduct of hostilities.20 From the outset, states
sought to prescribe the conditions under which they owe particular persons
affirmative legal protections derived from the laws and customs of war.
The recurring refrain in negotiations in this field for the past century can be
described as “to whom do we owe such protections and under what
circumstances do we owe them?” The constant effort to be as precise as
possible in describing the classes of persons entitled to jus in bello
protections is essential, because the same criteria prescribe the select class
who may lawfully conduct hostilities with an expectation of immunity.
Conversely, the law has attempted to clarify the proper scope of persons
and property who may lawfully be subjected to the effects of hostilities.
In that vein, the doctrine of reprisals has been an aspect of the effort to
regulate the conduct of conflict from the very onset of efforts to develop a
positivist regime. The first comprehensive effort to describe the law of war
in a written code (the Lieber Code) began as a request from the general-inchief of the Union armies, motivated by his confusion over the distinction
between lawful and unlawful combatants and the accompanying
obligations of a responsible commander towards participants in conflict
who are not associated with a sovereign state.21 Based on the stimulus of

20. The field is frequently described as international humanitarian law. This vague rubric is
increasingly used as shorthand to refer to the body of treaty norms that apply in the context of armed
conflict as well as the less distinct internationally accepted customs related to the treatment of persons.
The core of the international law of war includes the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3114 (replacing previous Geneva Wounded and Sick Conventions of 22 Aug.
1864, 6 July 1906, and 27 July 1929 by virtue of Article 59) [hereinafter Sick & Wounded Convention];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217
(replacing Hague Convention No. X of 18 Oct. 1907, 36 Stat. 2371) [hereinafter Sick & Wounded at
Sea Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (replacing the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 2021) [hereinafter Prisoner of War
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Civilians Convention].
21. Letter from General Halleck to Dr. Francis Lieber, Aug. 6. 1862, reprinted in RICHARD
SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 2 (1983) (this letter is justifiably seen as
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Confederate conduct, the Union army issued a disciplinary code governing
the conduct of hostilities (known worldwide as the Lieber Code) as
“General Orders 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the
United States in the Field” in April 1863.22 This was the first
comprehensive military code of discipline that sought to define the
parameters of permissible conduct during conflict. Then, as now, the laws
and customs of war remain integral to the very notion of military
professionalism by defining the class of persons against whom professional
military forces can lawfully apply violence based on principles of military
necessity and reciprocity.23 The principle endures in the law that persons
who do not enjoy lawful combatant status are not entitled to the benefits of
legal protections derived from the laws of war (including prisoner of war
status)24 and are subject to punishment for their warlike acts.
Seeking to deter violations of the professional code of conflict, Article
27 of the Lieber Code contemplated reprisals (defined by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) as acts “not otherwise lawful”)
based on the truism that

the catalyst that initiated more than a century of subsequent legal development around the world that led
to the modern framework of international humanitarian law).
22. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD
(Government Printing Office 1898) (1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3-23 (Dietrich Schindler &
Jiri Toman eds., 1988) [hereinafter Lieber Code]. For descriptions of the process leading to General
Orders 100 and the legal effect it had on subsequent efforts, see Grant R. Doty, The United States and
the Development of the Laws of Land Warfare, 156 MIL. L. REV. 224 (1998), and George B. Davis,
Doctor Francis Lieber’s Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 13
(1907) (The Lieber Code was a disciplinary code originating in the need for clear command guidance to
be promulgated, which in turn spawned more than a century of positivist legal evolution in the field of
international humanitarian law regulating the conduct of hostilities and the rights of those participating
in conflict or caught in the consequences of ongoing conflicts).
23. Unlawful Belligerency After September 11: History Revisited and Law Revised, in NEW
WARS, NEW LAWS ? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR TO 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 75 (David Wippman
& Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005). For detailed discussion of the role of attorneys and the military
culture that seeks disciplined compliance with the professional norms governing the conduct of
hostilities see Michael A. Newton, Modern Military Necessity: The Role & Relevance of Military
Lawyers, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 869 (2007) and Leslie C. Green, What is – Why is There –
The Law of War, in ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 1 (2d. ed. 1999).
24. This statement is true subject to the linguistic oddity introduced by Article 3 of the 1907
Hague Regulations, which makes clear that the armed forces of a state can include both combatants and
non-combatants (meaning chaplains and medical personnel), and that both classes of military personnel
are entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. See Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907, art. 3 (“the armed forces of the belligerent
parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a
right to be treated as prisoners of war”), entered into force Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in DOCUMENTATION
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 73 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR].
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The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can
the law of nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized nations
acknowledge retaliation as the sternest feature of war. A reckless
enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing himself
against the repetition of barbarous outrage.25

Framed as a necessary measure in order to preserve some recourse for
responding to brutalities committed by enemy forces, Lieber recognized
that reprisals ought of right to be a last recourse, and one that he
characterized as “the sternest feature” of war. Given the horrors of warfare
in his era, Lieber’s caution should be given great credence. Even in the
context of 1863, Professor Lieber recognized the dangerous moral hazards
that reprisal could engender by observing that
Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a measure of mere
revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and moreover,
cautiously and unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation shall only be
resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and the
character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.
Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and
farther from the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid steps
leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.26

Reprisals in practice have the duality of being a historically wellestablished mechanism for deterring violations of the law of armed conflict
even as they provide an ostensible rationale for otherwise unthinkable
atrocity. This is indeed a “curious position,” because while their use by
definition involves conduct that would otherwise constitute grievous
violations of humanitarian law, their deterrent value is undermined by the
potential for grievous retaliatory abuses.27
As only one of many possible illustrations of the moral and legal
complexities inherent in reprisals, historians often cite the German atrocity
committed on June 10, 1944 in which all 642 inhabitants of the French
town of Oradour-sur-Glane were executed in reprisal for the killing of one
German officer by resistance fighters (legally unprivileged belligerents
whose combatant activities constituted a war crime prior to the 1949
Geneva Conventions). According to German accounts, the reprisal
followed the German discovery of 73 German soldiers who were tortured
and murdered in the town of Tulle following their surrender to a partisan

25. Lieber Code, supra note 22, art. 27.
26. Id., art. 28.
27. See generally FRITS. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (2d. ed. 2007).
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force. The Germans hung nearly a hundred men based on suspicions that
they were involved in the massacre of German prisoners because, in the
words of one German officer, the partisans “butchered with bestial cruelty,
tortured, mutilated and ignominiously treated an opponent who was
protected by the Geneva Convention and international law, as well as by
the Franco-German armistice of 1940, and who furthermore had
surrendered. Thus they placed themselves beyond the bounds of the laws of
warfare and of humanity.”28
It is easy to see why one legal expert who participated in the
negotiations for the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
referred to Oradour-sur-Glane and opined that “reprisals achieve nothing,”
and “never result in the triumph of the rule of law” even when ostensibly
justified by enemy war crimes.29 In any event, permissible reprisals can
never be warranted on the basis of simple revenge or retaliation, and the
Oradour-sur-Glane facts illustrate the difficulty of distilling a pure motive
for any given act of reprisal. Indeed, it is clear that a claim of reprisal can
in fact serve as a subterfuge for widespread and deliberate attacks against
civilians.30 Such orchestrated state murder in the form of intentional attacks
against the civilian population is the essence of barbarity in warfare and
impermissible under any legal rationale in any type of conflict under any
conceivable circumstances.
Reprisals against prisoners of war were forbidden by the 1929 Geneva
Convention, and omitted from the 1929 Convention dealing with the
wounded and sick only “due to an oversight.”31 The subsequent ICRC
proposal to ban reprisals against all wounded and sick, prisoners of war,
and civilians was “approved unanimously and without opposition of any
28. The Story of Oradour-sur-Glane, http://www.scrapbookpages.com/Oradour-sur-Glane/Story/
SSversion02.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
29. Konstantin Obradovic, The Prohibition of Reprisals in Protocol I: Greater Protection for War
Victims, 520, 526 INT. REV. OF THE RED CROSS (Nov. 20 1997).
30. The example of state practice in the war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988 is also
worth considering. At that time, and at the time of this essay, neither state was a party to Protocol I,
although they had ratified the four Geneva Conventions. Despite pleas by the United Nations Security
Council and the ICRC, both parties to the conflict reserved the right to take reprisals in response to
violations of the laws of war by their opponent. Kalshoven asserts that the so-called “reprisal
bombardments” were not genuine reprisals, but willful attacks on the civilian population of the enemy,
“with the reprisal argument merely serving as a flimsy excuse.” This duplicitous use of the reprisals
doctrine may render this evidence of State practice useless. Shane Darcy, The Evolution of the Law of
Belligerent Reprisals, 175 MIL. L. REV. 184, 222 (2003) (citing Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals
Revisited, 21 NETH. Y. B. INT’L L. 43, 62 (1990); U.N. Doc S/RES/0540 (1983); 1983 ICRC Annual
Report 58 (Geneva 1983)).
31. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 807, at 242 (Y. Sandoz, Ch.Swinarski & B. Zimmermann eds.,
1987) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary on Protocol I].
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sort” during the next round of multilateral negotiations.32 Thus, all four of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions contain express prohibitions33 on reprisals,
the most notable of which is the extension to the civilian occupants of
occupied territory who are legally categorized as “protected persons”
within the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Given the abuses in World War II, courts developed a sophisticated
framework for evaluating claims of reprisal raised as an affirmative defense
during war crimes prosecutions. There were many successful prosecutions
in post-war military commissions in which national authorities evaluated
and rejected defense claims of legitimate reprisal.34 In one representative
but unreported case, a German general officer was convicted in 1947 for
placing allied prisoners of war alongside an oil refinery in lower Silesia
allegedly as a reprisal (though he could not specify for what acts) and
refusing them access to air raid shelters when the Allies bombed the
legitimate military target, thereby committing the crime of murder.35 Based
on this pattern of state practice, one of the field’s most preeminent experts
summarized the requirements for a permissible reprisal in the wake of the
1949 Geneva Conventions as follows:36
1) It must be a response to a prior violation of international law which
is imputable to the state against which the reprisal is directed;37
2) It must be reasonably proportionate;
3) It must be undertaken for the purpose of putting an end to the
enemy’s unlawful conduct and preventing further illegalities and not
for mere revenge; and
4) Since reprisals are a subsidiary means of redress, no other effective
means of redress must be available.

Other authoritative sources indicate that in addition to the above
considerations, reprisals must be based on reasonable notice as appropriate
to the circumstances, must be publicized (presumably to facilitate their

32. Id.
33. Sick & Wounded Convention, supra note 20, art. 46; Sick & Wounded at Sea Convention,
supra note 20, art. 47; Prisoner of War Convention, supra note 20, art.13; Civilians Convention, supra
note 20, art. 33.
34. For a summary of this line of cases, see SHANE DARCY, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139-48 (2007).
35. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 155, ¶ 8.29
n.103 (2004).
36. Christopher Greenwood, The Twilight of Belligerent Reprisals, in ESSAYS ON WAR IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 295, 299 (2006).
37. For the more exhaustive United Kingdom enunciation of the criteria for legitimate reprisals
based on the caselaw of the era and state practice see UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 35, 419, ¶ 16.17.
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deterrent effects), authorized only “at the highest level of government”
(presumably to exclude emotive acts of personal revenge), and must be
discontinued after the enemy eschews the egregious conduct that warranted
reprisals in the first place.38
The ink was hardly dry on the texts of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
when the ICRC began to advocate a further expansion of the law. The
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions resulted from four widely
attended diplomatic conferences held from 1974 to 1977. As noted above,
the law of war continually evolves in response to the needs of states
conducting conflict. The Protocols culminated the efforts to provide textual
application of the Geneva Conventions even in the context of armed
conflicts between a High Contracting Party and non-state actors, such as
guerrillas, insurgents, and so-called freedom fighters.39 These fundamental
modifications to the well-established law of combatant immunity would
have arguably been impossible without the backdrop and international
division caused by the Cold War. However, as in previous efforts to shape
the law of war around the reality of ongoing military and political realities,
the effort to draw sharp legal distinctions between protected civilians and
persons who could be lawfully targeted was the “driving concern” behind
the modern evolution embodied in the 1977 Protocols.40
Additional Protocol I was intended to be an all encompassing source
for updated rules for determining combatant status, as it was meant to
govern international armed conflicts, and to “reaffirm and develop” the
measures intended to protect the victims of armed conflict drawn from the
1949 Geneva Conventions by completing their humanitarian imperative.41
Protocol I in essence combined the Hague strand of international
humanitarian law (dealing with constraints on the means and methods for
conducting hostilities) with the Geneva strand (primarily focused on
achieving humanitarian goals). Despite the overtly politicized context in
which it was negotiated, it represented the end state of the law of
combatancy by attempting to reduce the combatant category to its
irreducible minimum while maximizing the class of persons and objects

38. Id.
39. See Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against
Terror, 42 TEX. INT’L L. J. 323, 342-56 (2009).
40. BEST, LAW AND WAR, supra note 18, at 257.
41. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 (Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts), art. 1, para 3, Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex
I, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
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protected from the adverse effects inherent in all armed conflicts.42 In light
of these normative goals, it should not shock the reader to realize that
Additional Protocol I extended the preexisting prohibitions on reprisals to
include:
1) The entire population of civilians not taking direct part in hostilities,
irrespective of their location;43
2) Civilian objects;44
3) Historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;45
4) Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such
as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and
supplies, and irrigation works;46
5) The natural environment;47
6) Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams,
dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations.48

The official ICRC Commentary notes that the ban on all forms of reprisal
in Protocol I “removes the only doubt that might remain with regard to the
absolute character of the obligations imposed on Parties to the conflict.”49
Additional Protocol I attempted to elevate non-state actors to the
status of lawful combatants, but the efficacy of those textual promises has
been eroded to a vanishing point by states’ unified and repeated
opposition.50 In the real world, the effort to decriminalize terrorists’
42. See Civilians Convention, supra note 20, art. 4. The legal category of “protected persons” was
not originally intended to be an all-inclusive category of civilians even on the face of the Convention.
Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides a definition of the legal term of art “protected
persons” that limits the applicability of the protections afforded by the other provisions of the
Convention as follows (using admittedly odd grammar):
Art. 4. Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals
of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a
co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they
are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.
43. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51(6).
44. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 52(1).
45. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 53(c).
46. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 54(4).
47. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 55(2).
48. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 56(4).
49. ICRC Commentary on Protocol I, supra note 31, ¶ 814, at 242.
50. See Newton, supra note 39, at 347-56 (documenting the refusal of some states to accept the
legal premise and its rejection by others in the form of understandings and reservations attached to
ratifications of Protocol I); MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW
OF WAR 186-88 (2009).
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conduct—so long as it complied with applicable jus in bello constraints in
the context of wars of national liberation—ran aground on the shoals of
sovereign survival. In practical terms, the Protocol I provisions regarding
combatant status for non-state actors in international armed conflicts have
only residual value as “agitational or rhetorical” tools because they have
never been applied.51 At the same time, the striking silence in the law
applicable to non-international armed conflicts means that any effort to
describe a “combatant engaged in a non-international armed conflict” is an
oxymoron. By extension, there is no form of “combatant immunity” in the
context of non-international armed conflicts.52 Terrorists and their
supporters have no form of automatic legal license or protection from
prosecution, even for acts that would be perfectly permissible when
conducted by combatants in an international armed conflict. There simply
is no legal category of “combatant” in a non-international armed conflict
irrespective of the moral imperatives claimed by one party or the other to
warrant hostile activities.53 This premise remains valid even when non-state
actors perpetrate violence seeking to accomplish goals similar to those of
the sovereign state.54 Non-state actors who participate in hostilities remain
subject to appropriate sanctions.

51. BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (2006).
52. David P. Forsythe, Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on NonInternational Armed Conflicts, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 272, 284 (1978).
53. In fact, a wide range of states coalesced around the effort to defeat the diplomatic draft
applicable to non-international armed conflicts that was tabled in 1975 by the ICRC and supported by
the U.S. and other western European nations. The group of states, which included Argentina, Honduras,
Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, India, Romania, and the U.S.S.R, succeeded in raising the
threshold for the application of Additional Protocol II, which was designed to regulate non-international
armed conflicts, precisely because of fears that extending humanitarian protections to guerillas and
irregular forces might elevate the status of rebel groups during such conflicts. ELEANOR C. MCDOWELL,
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, U.S. Department of State
Publication 8865, 803-6 (1976). The United States also succeeded in eliminating subjective qualifiers
such as “significant” or “important” that might have permitted some states to selectively apply the
provisions of Protocol II. Id. at 806.
54. See Andreas E. Feldmann & Maiju Perala, Assessing the Causes of Nongovernmental
Terrorism in Latin America, 46 LATIN AM. POL. AND SOC’Y 101, 104 (2004).
This article defines terrorism as ‘the use or threat of use of anxiety-inducing extranormal
violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition
to established governmental authority, where such action is intended to influence the attitudes
and behavior of a target group wider than victims. (Mickolus et al. 1989a xiii).’ For the
purpose of this work, terrorist incidents are restricted to actions that purposely seek to spread
terror in the population either by directly targeting noncombatants or by destroying
infrastructures that may affect the life and well-being of the civilian population at large. . . .
Insurgent, revolutionary, and right-wing terrorism are generally included under the terrorism
rubric.
Id.
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Similarly, it is conceivable that non-state actors could be subject to
appropriate punishments in the form of reprisals because the textual ban is
not at present an all-consuming incontrovertible norm. While the 1949
Conventions and Additional Protocol I regulate armed conflicts conducted
between “two or more High Contracting Parties” and contain the textual
language noted above, the ICRC Customary International Law Study
determined that “it is difficult to conclude that there has yet crystallized a
customary rule specifically prohibiting reprisals during the conduct of
hostilities.”55 The treaty provisions applicable to non-international armed
conflicts (certainly the dominant mode of modern conflict) are silent with
respect to specific prohibitions on reprisals because the delegates
negotiating Protocol II could not reach consensus on the issue.56 At the
other extreme, though four states spoke to affirm the permissibility of
limited reprisals under specifically enumerated circumstances, the ICRC
correctly concluded that there is “insufficient evidence that the very
concept of lawful reprisal in non-international armed conflict has ever
materialized in international law.”57
Widespread and consistent state practice following the treaty
prohibitions described above tends to undercut the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) Trial Chamber’s assertion in
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic that reprisals are subject to “universal revulsion”
based on the premise that they are “inherently a barbarous means of
seeking compliance with international law.”58 Setting aside the many
instances of state practice [recitation of which would be far beyond the
scope of this short essay] that would indicate recourse to reprisals in fact if
not in phraseology, the lack of uniform acceptance even of the stark treaty
prohibitions belies their nature as customary norms. For example, the
Italian government made the following declaration upon ratification of the
Protocol: “Italy will react to serious and systematic violations by an enemy
of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocol I and in particular
Articles 51 and 52 with all means admissible under international law.”59
The German,60 Egyptian,61 and French62 governments all made declarations
55. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, Vol. I 523 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study].
56. DARCY, supra note 34, 166-71.
57. ICRC Study, supra note 55, at 527.
58. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 528 (Jan. 14, 2000) (Judgment).
59. Reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 24, at 507.
60. Id. at 505 (the German declaration regarding serious and systematic violations of the laws and
customs of war is virtually identical to the Italian declaration quoted in the text above, and ostensibly
preserves the right to engage in limited reprisals, particularly in non-international armed conflicts).
61. Id. at 504.
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indicating that resort to reasonable reprisals in extreme circumstances could
be warranted to respond to ongoing violations by an adversary.
In addition, the United Kingdom emphasized in its own statement that
any adversary must “scrupulously observe” the obligations of humanitarian
law, and accordingly “serious and deliberate attacks” against the civilian
population will entitle its forces to “take measures otherwise prohibited by
the Articles” to the extent that such measures are “necessary for the sole
purpose of compelling the adverse party to cease committing violations.”63
Thus, it is logically and legally consistent that none of the constitutive
documents of international or internationalized tribunals formed over the
past two decades have deemed the taking of reprisals against any persons
or objects as an articulated violation of the laws of armed conflict.64 The
Statutes of the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the highly comprehensive Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court have all refrained, by this
omission, from commenting on the legality of reprisals.
In short, the lex lata does not appear to support the sweeping
conclusion of the ICTY Trial Chamber that “the rule which states that
reprisals against the civilian population as such, or individual civilians, are
prohibited in all circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful
behaviour [sic] of the other party, is an integral part of customary
international law and must be respected in all armed conflicts.”65 Partly on
62. Darcy, supra note 30, 226 (The government of the French Republic declares that it will apply
the provisions of Article 51, paragraph 8 in such a way that the interpretation of those will not be an
obstacle to the employment, in conformity with international law, of those means which it estimates are
indispensable for protecting its civilian population from serious, manifest, and deliberate violations of
the Geneva Conventions and this Protocol by the enemy).
63. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT , supra note 35,
421, ¶ 16.19.1 (further clarifying that appropriate reprisals must be proportionate to the nature of the
enemy violations, constrained by the preexisting prohibitions of the 1949 Conventions, based on formal
authority from the “highest level of government” and only occur following formal warnings).
64. This point becomes apparent after comparison of the various constitutive documents of the ad
hoc and internationalized tribunals, as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. See
also Darcy, supra note 30, 244.
65. Prosecutor v. Martic, Review of the Indictment Under Rule 61, Case No. IT-95-11, ¶ 19 (8
Mar. 1996). The addition of an entirely new international convention in 1949, designed to create legal
entitlements on behalf of the civilian population, gave rise to the dualistic view of status that persists in
some quarters to this day. The ICRC took the position in its official commentary that because there “is
no intermediate status” between combatant and civilian, every person in enemy hands “must have some
status under international law.” ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949: VOLUME 4, 51 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross 1958) (“Every person in enemy hands must have
some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third
Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel
of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in
enemy hands can be outside the law.”).
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the basis of the state practice commingled with the express declarations of
states, one distinguished human rights scholar concluded that “it cannot be
stated categorically that the doctrine of reprisals is not of relevance in
noninternational [sic] armed conflicts.”66 As a result, despite superficial
appeals to overriding humanitarian imperatives, a thoughtful assessment of
the rational basis for reviving the hard law of reprisals is in order.
Thoughtful reassessment is far from a cry for a rush to reinvigorated and
rampant reprisals. It also bears repeating that in my view it is overly
simplistic to conflate consideration of a potential role for reprisals in the
wake of September 11 with a movement to reinforce the primitive law of
retaliation, lex talionis, which demands equal and exact injury as a form of
revenge against an adversary. Similarly, as the example of the atrocities at
Oradour-sur-Glane illustrates, the debate over the utility of reprisals ought
not to degenerate into coarse calls for collective retribution and cannot
provide the subterfuge for the intentional murder of innocents.67
II. WHY REPRISALS MIGHT BE RATIONAL TOOLS OF STATE
POWER
Reasonable reprisals may represent the best long-term way to erode
support for those non-state actors who would willfully ignore the
humanitarian rules protecting innocent civilians, thereby violating the most
basic human rights of their victims. The resurgence of deliberate terror
aimed at western civilization destroyed any residue of the naïve notion that
there is a bright legal line neatly dividing armed conflicts into distinct
geographic combat zones in which innocent civilians (who are legally
protected from deliberate hostilities) are never commingled with
combatants who may lawfully be targeted and killed.68 The attacks
transformed an esoteric problem that was important only to specialists in
the law of armed conflict into a tactical and legal problem highly relevant
to current operations. Al Qaeda and its supporters acted as private citizens
in declaring war on American citizens and values,69 and carried out their

66. DARCY, supra note 34, 171 (noting also that the divergence of opinion expressed by the ICRC,
the ICTY, and scholars and the lack of prohibition contained in Protocol II indicates that the absolutist
stance of the ICRC reflects a “precautionary attempt motivated by humanitarian concerns” rather than
an embedded legal prohibition that is reflective of the developed state of law).
67. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
68. This dualistic view of the law was privately expressed by the International Committee of the
Red Cross and publicly expounded by a number of commentators on the law of armed conflict.
69. Osama bin Laden has made more than fifty declarations of war against the United States
(summary of statements on file with author). In the official fatwa signed by Bin Laden and four others
on February 23, 1998 he asserted that
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attacks with a purposeful intensity that rose to the level of armed conflict
by any common sense definition. Moreover, the conflict against al Qaeda
and its supporters is an armed conflict governed by the law of armed
conflict within the meaning of the term as accepted by the ICTY.70
However, despite rhetoric referring to a struggle for liberation and self
determination, no nation would ever accept the normative proposition that a
private group of terrorists acted with a legally cognizable expectation of
combatant immunity. Indeed, the essence of asymmetric warfare is
achieved when professionalized military forces confront an enemy who
seeks to gain an otherwise impossible military parity through exploitation
of a deliberate disregard for humanitarian law.71 The hallmark of modern
combat operations is that non-state actors deliberately exploit civilians to
gain significant tactical and strategic advantages. A small group of nonstate actors can inflict harm to innocent victims and the structures of
ordered society that is far disproportionate to their numbers or

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual
obligation for every Muslim who can do it in any country—this until the al-Aqsa Mosque
[Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [Mecca] are liberated from their grip, and until their armies
withdraw from all the lands of Islam, defeated, shattered, and unable to threaten any Muslim.
This is in accordance with the word of the Most High—“Fight the pagans all together as they
fight you all together,” and the word of the Most High “Fight them until there is no more
tumult or oppression, and all religion belongs to Allah.”
And the Most High said “And why should you not fight in the cause of Allah and on behalf of
those oppressed men, women and children who cry out Lord! Rescue us from this town and
its oppressors. Give us from Your Presence some protecting friend. Give us from Your
Presence some defender.”
By Allah’s leave, we call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded
to comply with Allah’s order to kill the Americans and seize their money wherever and
whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch
the raid on the Devilo’s Army—the Americans—and whoever allies with them from the
supporters of Satan, and to rout them so that they may learn a lesson.
THE AL QAEDA READER 13 (Raymond Ibrahim, ed. and transl. 2007).
70. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction), ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995) (“an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”).
71. Walter Laquer, The Terrorism to Come, HOOVER INSTITUTION POLICY REVIEW, 3-4, (Aug. &
Sept. 2004).
When regular soldiers do not stick to the rules of warfare, killing or maiming prisoners,
carrying out massacres, taking hostages or committing crimes against the civilian population,
they will be treated as war criminals. If terrorists behaved according to these norms they
would have little if any chance of success; the essence of terrorist operations now is
indiscriminate attacks against civilians. But governments defending themselves against
terrorism are widely expected not to behave in a similar way but to adhere to international law
as it developed in conditions quite different from those prevailing today. Terrorism does not
accept laws and rules, whereas governments are bound by them; this, in briefest outline, is
asymmetric warfare. If governments were to behave in a similar way, not feeling bound by
existing rules and laws such as those against the killing of prisoners, this would be bitterly
denounced.
Id.
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technological inferiority. Al Qaeda and its supporters accordingly forfeited
the rights that would normally accrue to civilian persons caught in the
midst of hostilities, chief among them the right to be free from deliberate
efforts at targeting them.72
The clarity with which international law categorizes and condemns
discrete manifestations of terrorism nevertheless masks the indeterminacy
of the underlying definitional framework. “Terrorism” is a concept caught
in a kaleidoscope of conflicting sociological, political, psychological,
moral, and legal perspectives. The paradox in a post-September 11 world is
that the U. N. Security Council requires nations to “accept and carry out”73
resolutions that oblige them to act against “terrorists” and “terrorism.”
Breaking down the macro problem of terrorism into identifiable
manifestations, nation states have negotiated and ratified a web of
occasionally overlapping multilateral conventions built on the cornerstone
of the sovereign enforcement of applicable norms. The persistence of
transnational terrorism as a feature of the international community shows
that the plethora of conventional criminal approaches is no panacea.74
September 11 highlighted this striking systematic failure that has been
reinforced by the repeated attacks orchestrated to intentionally destroy
civilian lives and infrastructure in inter alia Spain, England, Indonesia,
India.
Nevertheless, the commingling of jus ad bellum norms with jus in
bello constraints may result in a deadly policy paralysis for states that seek
to adhere to the framework of international law even as they protect the
lives and property of their citizenry. States will predictably find themselves
facing an adaptable enemy that may not be targeted on the basis of self
defense due to an unproven and perhaps unprovable lack of imminency,
even as they are hindered from rapid jus in bello targeting due to the highly

72. The law of armed conflict provides that lawful attacks may only be directed at military
objectives (which includes enemy combatants). Civilians may not be deliberately attacked unless they
directly participate in hostilities. See Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51 (2 & 3). Celebrated in
international law as the principle of distinction, the president of the ICRC opined that this principle is
“crucial.” Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, International Humanitarian Law at the Beginning of the 21st Century,
26th Round Table in San Remo on the Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law: “The Two
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions: 25 Years Later –Challenges and Prospects,” (Sept. 5,
2002), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/EFC5A1C8D8DD70B9C1256C36002EF
C1E (last visited May 21, 2010).
73. U.N. CHARTER, art. 25.
74. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL
CONVENTIONS (1837-2001) (2001) (providing the text of numerous terrorism related international
agreements, which in turn help to document the historical trends in extending positivist regulation over
the prohibited range of terrorist acts); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A
Policy Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT. L. J. 83, 90 (2001).
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contested nature of the direct participation criteria that might permit
uncontroversial operations. At the same time, the confluence of human
rights protections with the provisions flowing from humanitarian law poses
another serious political and pragmatic difficulty under the status quo. The
laws and customs of warfare of course operate against the backdrop of
human rights norms that elevate the prohibition on extrajudicial executions
to a non-derogable, unwavering requirement. This is absolutely appropriate
because the American conception of state power flows from the very
obligation of governments to defend and protect the lives, rights, and
property of the citizenry.
However, the conflation of humanitarian purposes derived from both
the laws and customs of war and from human rights law to seek maximum
protection for humanity could be seen as particularly inapplicable in light
of the terrorist objective of deliberately inflicting casualties and
maximizing the suffering of innocent humans, of whatever age, gender, or
ethnicity. Nevertheless, human rights objections prevent most states from
lauding the killing of specific al Qaeda figures “even when that struggle is
backed by U.N. Security Council resolutions authorizing force, . . . and
even given the widespread agreement that the United States had both an
inherent right and legal authorization to undertake military action against
the perpetrators of the [September 11] attacks.”75
A set of measured responses culminating in reasonable reprisals might
in theory be the best way to balance the humanitarian goals of the
competing bodies of law. Rather than forcing states to seek recourse in
pleas of unavoidable necessity or legitimate self defense, a clear-eyed
reappraisal of the scope and utility of reprisals could produce
straightforward jus in bello criteria for responding to unlawful acts of
terror. I do not intend to oversimplify the argument into a simple, and
completely illegitimate, tu quoque argument. Indeed, that is precisely the
point. Whether al Qaeda or some future terrorist group disregards the
fundamental precepts of civilized warfare the legal obligations that inhere
to law abiding, or at least accepting, states remain fixed and constant. To
that end, sovereign states should consult together with the aim of creating
an agreed upon multilateral framework for carefully calibrated responses.
The “reasonable responses” postulated by this essay are those grounded on
an empirical assessment of their deterrent value or framed as appropriate
punishment for prior acts of terror. The archaic phraseology of the Lieber
Code in this respect seems to resonate in the modern context; i.e., acts

75. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 364 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009).
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designed “as a means of protective retribution”76 rather than emotional
vengeance could be permissible. The dichotomy of the Lieber formulation
is that acts aimed at prospective deterrence as well as those seeking to
impose a retrospective punishment would be permissible. This would be
even more acceptable under the oversight of some neutral adjudicative
body to which states present the facts warranting their lawful exercise of a
calibrated right of reasonable reprisal. As noted above, in the long run this
reliance on a reconsidered jus in bello framework may be the most morally
acceptable and humane strategy for serving a strategic imperative of
protecting the peace and property of innocent persons.
Proponents of the blanket ban on reprisals would argue that the term
“reasonable reprisals” is itself oxymoronic. Indeed, the ICTY Trial
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Martic inferred that any reprisal conducted in the
context of a non-international armed conflict would violate customary
international law as well as the provision of Additional Protocol II
guaranteeing civilians and those hors de combat the right to be treatment
humanely “in all circumstances” and “without any adverse distinction.”77
According to this line of logic, any conceivable reprisal, for any reason,
and applying any agreed upon framework for implementation would violate
the “absolute and non-derogable” right to humane treatment. The ICTY
Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic later wrote in a similar vein that
“the reprisal killing of innocent persons, more or less chosen at random,
without any requirement of guilt or any form of trial, can safely be
characterized as a blatant infringement of the most fundamental principles
of human rights” which in turn compelled the conclusion that “belligerent
reprisals against civilians and the fundamental rights of human beings are
absolutely inconsistent legal concepts.”78
The perspective taken by the ICTY Trial Chambers (and echoed by
the ICRC in the Customary Law Study) takes the narrowest possible view
of the human rights of the innocent victims of terrorist attacks. It might
76. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
77. Prosecutor v. Martic, supra note 64, ¶ 18.
78. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 58, ¶ 529. Though the Trial Chamber acknowledged a
distinct lack of state practice to support a finding that reprisals are prohibited as a matter of customary
international law, the Trial Chamber was undeterred and in essence fashioned its own unique template
for discerning the existence of international law:
This is however an area where opinio iuris sive necessitatis may play a much greater role than
usus, as a result of the . . . Martens Clause. In the light of the way States and courts have
implemented it, this Clause clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian law
may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or
the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other
element, in the form of opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result of the imperatives of
humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the
emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law.
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well be said that the ad hoc Tribunal Trial Chambers adopted the view that
the human rights of the victims of indiscriminate terrorist attacks are
automatically subordinated to the rights of the persons subject to reprisals,
irrespective of the calibrated nature of the framework for reprisals accepted
by states, or the nature of the precedent warnings, or the stated purposes.
The Trial Chambers also seem to forget that the military commissions in
the wake of World War II provided detailed legal templates for evaluating
permissible reprisals from unlawful war crimes (for such issues as, inter
alia, the scope of permissible proportionality in responding to enemy
violations). It is also clear that the ICTY decisions took no notice of
evolving technology that may change the form or focus of future reprisals.
My point is that a bright-line “bulwark against brutality” prevents any
good-faith dialogue on the means and methods for balancing humanitarian
objectives with the overriding strategic imperative of deterring terrorist
attacks or punishing those who orchestrate indiscriminate violence
intentionally directed against civilians.
Finally, the reasoning of the ICTY Trial Chambers would seem to
discount any calculus of larger moral utility. The current lack of effective
measures to incentivize non-state armed groups (or terrorist groups)
towards recognition and compliance with international humanitarian law is
one of the most insoluble dilemmas facing commanders and policy makers.
As noted above, deliberate attacks against innocent civilians are crimes
under all circumstances, both for state and non-state actors. However,
national security authorities of all states need viable tools in order to
protect the economic and social structures of civilized society. Thoughtful
multilateral dialogue on the permissible scope of reprisals directed against
those who fund, plan, and support terrorist acts could well avoid allegations
of collective punishment and create a disincentive for terrorist attacks. In
other words, the concept of “innocent persons” as it relates to terrorist acts
ought to be an important element of transnational dialogue. The absence of
any international agreement (or even discussion) of the scope and utility of
permissible reprisals against those who perpetrate terrorist acts permits
propagandized exploitation of any state responses, which in turn may
spread extremist vows for revenge and further endanger innocent civilians.
Assuming that states agreed to a careful delineated multilateral
framework for engaging in limited reprisals undertaken only for proper
motivations and under proper supervision, the relative good achieved by
the reprisal would certainly be a relevant consideration. To reiterate, the
current presumption of blanket prohibition prevents rational discussions
and good faith evaluation of state actions. Effective reprisals may be the
most moral way to prevent larger atrocities and the concomitant suffering
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of many more innocent victims. Experience since the 1970s indicates that
the permission and guidance of an authority figure is the primary enabling
mechanism which molds people into groups capable of violent operations.79
History is replete with examples of leaders whose personal influence
became the essential element leading to military operational
effectiveness.80 Empirical data is beginning to point clearly to authority
figures as a major factor in the success or failure of a given military
operation, and the importance of the authority figure is inflated in an
asymmetric conflict. The possibility of reasonable reprisals based on a
priori consensus criteria may well be the most effective method for
incentivizing non-state actors to comply with the jus in bello, or for
efficiently sanctioning violations and preventing even more egregious
suffering by innocent victims.
The U.S. doctrine for counterinsurgency operations expressly
highlights this point as follows: “Movement leaders provide strategic
direction to the insurgency. They are the ‘idea people’ and the planners.
They usually exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of
revolutionary ideas, and personal charisma. In some insurgencies, they may
hold their position through religious, clan, or tribal authority.”81 Reprisals
that kill a dozen persons but result in the protection of thousands would
seem to have a compelling moral imperative. Deliberate attacks on such
movement leaders would foreseeably be controversial under the normal jus
in bello paradigm given the debates over whether and under what
circumstances terrorist leaders or other key leaders of non-state groups lose
their status as protected civilians who are never subject to being
intentionally targeted. Thus, international law should clarify an alternative
jus in bello prong that could permit such attacks in limited circumstances.

79. DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR
143 (Little Brown and Company 1995) (“Someone who has not studied the matter would
underestimate the influence of leadership in enabling killing on the battlefield but those who have been
there know better. A 1973 study by Kranss, Kaplan, and Kranss investigated the factors that make a
soldier fire. They found that the individuals who had no combat experience assumed that ‘being fired
upon’ would be the critical factor in making them fire. However, veterans listed ‘being told to fire’ as
the most critical factor.”).
80. See JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE 114 (Penguin Books 1983) (“For the English [at
Agincourt], the presence of the King would also have provided what present-day soldiers call a ‘moral
factor’ of great importance. The personal bond between leader and follower lies at the root of all
explanations of what does and does not happen in battle: and that bond is always strongest in martial
societies . . . .”); see also id. at 277 (noting that commanders were the most important human factor in
willing the masses to fight in the First World War) [hereinafter Face of Battle].
81. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24, MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING
PUBLICATION NO. 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY, at 1-12, ¶ 1-61 (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://
usacac.army.mil/CAC/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf.
AND SOCIETY
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Reprisals which either kill or incapacitate the key terrorist leader(s) may
have a disproportionate effect both in deterring future atrocities and in
punishing those responsible for past acts. To reiterate, the broad and nonderogable prohibition on reprisals prevents open discussion about these
moral implications.
CONCLUSION
Reasonable reprisals grounded on an empirical assessment of their
deterrent value or framed as appropriate punishment for prior acts of terror
may be the most humane strategy for serving the strategic imperatives of
civilized society confronted with a persistent and adaptive terrorist enemy.
Hugo Grotius opined that “punishment of an evil suffered is a just cause for
waging warfare,”82 and that ancient sentiment might well accord with the
modern common sense of citizens who suffered at the hands of
indiscriminate terrorist violence. It is beyond the scope of this essay to
enumerate the contours of what would constitute reasonable reprisals or to
elaborate on the circumstances that would warrant their use. That is
properly the province of state delegates in the real world of countervailing
interests and colliding spheres of influence. One scholar laments that a
multilateral treaty that defines terms and identifies the appropriate class of
persons or objects that can lawfully be the subjects of reprisals during noninternational armed conflicts “is presently most desirable.”83
In my view, states should unite to craft a deliberate multilateral
approach to regulating reprisals that embodies a consensus view of the
appropriate contexts and reasonable constraints that would limit an
otherwise pernicious practice. The failure to create such a treaty forces
states to articulate their own rationales for what are in fact reprisals. This
practice, in turn, creates additional uncertainty given the vicissitudes of
political postures and the shifting stance of varying judicial panels.
Reliance on state action and reaction to shape a new customary
international law of reprisals in turn leads to the real possibility that a more
expansive regime will be crafted in practice than would otherwise receive
consensus approval in specified treaty text. In the absence of
comprehensive treaty provisions related to permissible reprisals, it is clear
to me that categorical rejection of any concept of reasonable reprisals
serves to short circuit rational discourse on the issue. The resulting

82. Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Authority and the Problem of Non-State Actors, in ETHICS, AUTHORITY,
WAR: NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE JUST WAR TRADITION 46, 56-60 (Eric A. Heinze & Brent J.
Steele eds., 2009).
83. Darcy, supra note 34, at 244.
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uncertainty almost guarantees that state responses to terrorist acts will be
hindered and less effective than would otherwise be possible.
It may well be true that reprisals are inadvisable and inappropriate on
operational grounds or on a policy basis to prevent their value as a
propaganda tool. As noted above, the spare language of the treaties does
not settle the issue in the real world of practice. Diplomats debating the role
and scope of reasonable reprisals may also conclude that they really do not
materially advance efforts to induce compliance of non-state actors with
humanitarian law. Such issues could only be clarified through detailed
negotiations that are forestalled at present by reflexive acceptance of the
textual prohibitions.
Nonetheless the laws and customs of warfare were never intended to
provide a shield behind which terrorists would be free to gnaw away at the
values of freedom and peace. Private efforts to wage war fall outside the
structure of law that binds sovereign states together on the basis of
reciprocity and shared community interests. In the modern vernacular,
those who commit acts in contravention of the applicable conventions are
termed terrorists, regardless of their ideological or religious motivations.84
Thus, as noted above, no state in the world willingly accepts the normative
proposition that international law bestows upon private citizens an
affirmative right to become combatants whose warlike activities are
recognized and protected. The right to engage in appropriate reprisals is
more than a residual appendage of sovereignty. It reflects the very essence
of sovereign survival and respect for the dignity and individual worth of
humans in the context of civilized society. Surely the peace-loving states of
the world can find common ground in the common pursuit to protect
persons from the effects of lawless terrorist violence. Thoughtful and
multilateral reassessment of the lawful scope and rationale for reasonable
reprisals is overdue.

84. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 2175
U.N.T.S. 197, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999) (requiring acceding states to “adopt such
measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that
criminal acts within the scope of this Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar
nature.”).

